Determinants of delays at European airports by Santos, Georgina & Robin, Maël
  1  
  
The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is 
published and can be cited as 
 
Santos, G. and M. Robin (2010), ‘Determinants of Delays at European 
Airports’, Transportation Research B: Methodological, Vol. 44, N°3, 
pp. 392-403. DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.10.007 
 
 
 
 
 
Determinants of Delays at 
 
European Airports 
 
Georgina Santos and Maël Robin 
 
Georgina Santos* 
Smith School of Enterprise and Environment 
and Transport Studies Unit 
University of Oxford 
Oxford, OX1 3QY 
Tel: + 44 7984 927 115 
Georgina.Santos@tsu.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Maël Robin 
Transport Studies Unit 
School of Geography and the Environment 
University of Oxford 
Oxford, OX1 3QY 
Tel: + 44 1865 275 991 
Mael.Robin.2003@polytechnique.org 
 
 
 
*Corresponding author 
  2  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Support from the Economic and Social Research Council under award RES-000-22-
0896 is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are indebted to CODA and 
EUROCONTROL for provision of delay information, and to Thomas Pertuiset for 
research assistance.  
 
The authors are especially grateful to the editor of this Special Issue, Jan Brueckner, and 
to an anonymous referee, for their very careful comments, which substantially improved 
this paper. 
 
Thanks also go to María Emma Santos, for help with Stata, James Cole, from Airport 
Coordination Limited (ACL), for help and advice on slot coordination and slot trading 
in the UK and in the EU, and to participants of two seminars at the Transport Studies 
Unit, University of Oxford. Thanks are also due to the attendees of the Transportation 
Research Board 85
th
 and 86
th
 Annual Meetings and the 11
th
 World Conference on 
Transportation Research, where previous versions of the paper were presented.  
 
The Oxford Supercomputing Centre resources were used to produce most of the results 
reported in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
  3  
 
Determinants of Delays at  
 
European Airports 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using flight data for the period 2000-2004 we find that four significant variables in 
explaining delays at European airports are market concentration, slot coordination, hub 
airports and hub airlines. We find evidence for the hypothesis that airlines internalize 
the effects of self-imposed congestion, but the results for the hub variables are 
somewhat puzzling. While delays are higher at hub airports, hub airlines experience 
lower delays than non-hub airlines. This may be at least partly explained by the special 
characteristics of the hub-and-spoke system in Europe, which is less extensive and more 
constrained, relative to the U.S. If introduced in Europe, efficient airport congestion 
tolls should be carrier-specific to account for the differences in internalization of delays. 
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Airport delays. Airport congestion. Hub-and-spoke. Congestion externalities. Airport 
demand management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Delays at airports have become a very common problem worldwide. In Europe, the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA) monitors delays at a number of selected major 
European airports
1
. In 2005 over 20 per cent of all intra-European flights leaving from 
these airports departed more than 15 minutes later than their scheduled departure time 
(AEA, 2006). In the U.S. the Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transport 
Statistics reports that 30 per cent of domestic flights arrived more than 15 minutes late 
in July 2007, up from 20 per cent in July 2003 (Carlton et al, 2007, p.4). These are just 
two examples of the magnitude of the flight delay problem. 
Mayer and Sinai (2003) estimate a model relating congestion to hub-and-spoke 
operations and airport concentration. Hubs matter because interchange of passengers 
requires tight spacing of arrival and departure banks, causing congestion. Airport 
concentration matters because of internalization of congestion, as identified by Daniel 
(1995) and Brueckner (2002a,b). In Mayer and Sinai (2003) airlines are presumed to 
internalize the effects of self-imposed congestion, so that flights at an airport where one 
carrier operates most of the traffic will be scheduled to produce fewer delays than would 
result from the same flight volume at a less concentrated airport.  
Using data on delays at the individual flight level, Mayer and Sinai (2003) confirm 
both the hubbing and internalization hypotheses by finding that flight delays are higher 
                                               
1
 These are Amsterdam Schiphol, Athens, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, 
Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Geneva, Helsinki Vantaa, Istanbul Atatürk, Larnaca, Lisbon, London 
Gatwick, London Heathrow, Madrid Barajas, Manchester, Milan Linate, Milan Malpensa, 
Munich, Oslo, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Paris Orly, Roma Fiumicino, Stockholm Arlanda, 
Vienna, and Zurich. 
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at hubs and lower at concentrated airports. Brueckner (2002a,b) finds similar results 
using much more highly aggregated data. Extending Mayer and Sinai’s methodology, 
Rupp (2009) finds hub effects but evidence against internalization, differentiating 
between delays from the airline’s and passenger’s perspectives. His measure of airline 
delay is excess travel time, defined as the difference between actual travel time and the 
minimum travel time on the route, while passenger delay is the difference between 
actual and scheduled arrival (and departure) times. Rupp finds that (a) from the airline’s 
perspective, excess travel times tend to be lower at highly concentrated airports, 
indicating that airlines internalize airport congestion; and (b) from passengers’ 
perspective, departure and arrival delays are more likely at highly concentrated airports, 
suggesting that airlines do not internalize passenger delay costs. 
Rupp’s conclusion against internalization matches evidence found in Daniel’s (1995) 
paper and his subsequent work
2
, which use a different methodological approach.  When 
trying to determine the presence of atomistic behaviour, Daniel’s work focuses on 
traffic peaks within a day. Mayer and Sinai (2003) and Brueckner (2002a,b), on the 
other hand, focus on differences in delays across airports, linking these delays to 
differences in market concentration in an indirect test for internalization. 
                                               
2
 Daniel and Harback (2008) do not find much evidence of internalization of delays by 
dominant airlines. They conduct specification tests using stochastic bottleneck models of airport 
congestion to determine whether dominant airlines internalize self-imposed delays at 27 major 
US airports for the period 28 July to 3 August 2003. The tests mostly reject internalization and 
fail to reject non-internalization by dominant airlines. They conclude that airport congestion 
charges should treat all delays as external. 
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The present paper achieves two goals: it extends Mayer and Sinai’s methodology to 
the (unstudied) European case, and it provides further evidence on the disputed 
internalization hypothesis. The results on the internalization hypothesis are favorable, 
but the effect of hubbing on delays is less straightforward in Europe than in the U.S. 
context. Mayer and Sinai (2003) find that delays for a given airline rise both with 
overall airport traffic (measured by total destinations served) and with the size of the 
airline’s own hub operation at the airport (again, measured by destinations). The current 
results confirm the first effect, but show that own-hub size has a negative rather than 
positive effect on delays. 
Although the work reported here was initially inspired in Mayer and Sinai (2003), we 
soon found that the data that exist for Europe are not as rich or detailed as theirs.  Most 
of the data used in this study were provided by the Central Office for Delay Analysis 
(CODA), which is part of Eurocontrol, the European Organization for the Safety of Air 
Navigation. There are three important data limitations. First, for confidentiality reasons, 
delay information on a flight-by-flight basis was not provided, and aggregates were 
provided instead. For this reason, it was not possible to replicate Mayer and Sinai’s 
measure of excess travel time, defined as travel time not in excess of the scheduled time 
but in excess of the minimum feasible travel time (observed from individual flight data). 
Second, the time between landing and reaching the gate is not included in the data base 
provided by Eurocontrol, so that delay is computed as the difference between scheduled 
and actual landing time. Third, given that the measures of airline airport hub size are 
time invariant, airport fixed effects (dummy variables for each origin and destination 
airport, used by Mayer and Sinai (2003)) cannot be included when these variables are 
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present. We can only include fixed effects if we do not include the airport hub size 
dummies.
3
  
Section 2 discusses some important institutional features of European airports, which 
make them different from airports in other parts of the world, including the U.S. Section 
3 presents the model and describes the data. Section 4 analyzes the main findings.  
Section 5 concludes. 
2. THE EUROPEAN SETTING 
In this section we briefly describe market concentration, hub-and-spoke patterns, and 
slot coordination in Europe, all of which present differences with respect to the U.S. 
case. 
Airport market concentration, a key explanatory variable, is low in Europe, relative 
to the U.S. Concentration in the present paper is defined as the Herfindal-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) based on the share of flights by the various airlines that serve the airport. 
The HHI was computed for each airport in our sample and each season in every year 
(with the years being 2000 to 2004, and the seasons being winter, spring, summer and 
autumn). 
The concentration at origin airports in our sample has a mean of 0.18 and a standard 
deviation of 0.12. This shows that European airports are in general not very 
concentrated, especially when compared to airports in the U.S. Mayer and Sinai (2003, 
                                               
3
 The estimator given by an OLS regression is not defined if the specification simultaneously 
includes fixed effects for airports and variables which are constant throughout time for each 
airport. 
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p.1203, Table 1) report a mean concentration of 0.40 and a standard deviation of 0.21 
for their origin airports. 
Although, given the lack of origin-destination ticket data, it is difficult to tell for 
sure, the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system, so widely used in the U.S., does not seem to be as  
extensive in Europe. Burghouwt and Hakfoort (2001) and Brueckner and Pels (2007) 
give a number of possible reasons. These include shorter travel distances within Europe, 
where countries are small; competition from other transport modes, such as high speed 
rail; national interests standing in the way of the emergence of hubs in Europe;
4
 and, 
airlines depending on bilateral agreements between their country and other countries for 
intercontinental services, despite deregulation of the European aviation market.
5
 
In the U.S., four of the most congested airports, JFK and La Guardia in New York 
City, O’Hare in Chicago, and National Airport in Washington DC, are slot constrained. 
In Europe a far greater share of airports are slot controlled.
6
 Member states in the EU 
are required to appoint an independent entity in charge of slot allocation at an airport, if 
                                               
4
 In contrast, the U.S. population lies within a single national boundary and there is no 
equivalent to a flag carrier system. The old flag-carrier regime in Europe also encouraged the 
emergence of point-to-point routes, with modest connecting traffic, and prevented the 
proliferation of efficient hub-and-spoke networks. 
5
 These agreements may act as an obstacle in relocating a hub from one airport to another, for 
example. 
6
 The list of slot constrained airports in Europe for the year 2004 is presented in the Appendix. 
Although the list was compiled for each scheduling period for each year between 2000 and 2004 
and the information added on to the data base, there was little variation, with only a few airports 
changing the level of slot coordination during this period.  
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it experiences excess demand for usage. Thus, all airports in Europe can be classified as 
follows: 
 Level 1: non-coordinated airports 
 Level 2: schedule facilitated airports 
 Level 3: fully coordinated airports 
Non-coordinated airports are airports that have no excess demand, so that slot 
coordination is not needed. Schedule facilitated airports are airports ‘where there is 
potential for congestion at some periods of the day, week or scheduling period’ (IATA, 
2005, p.7) and where schedules are facilitated by a coordinator, who seeks cooperation 
and voluntary schedule changes to avoid congestion. The slots are not actually 
allocated, and there is no preference according to historic use of slots (IATA, 2005, 
p.4). Fully coordinated airports are airports where the demand for facilities exceeds 
availability during the relevant period and where attempts to resolve problems through 
voluntary schedule changes have failed (IATA, 2005, p.11). All airlines wishing to land 
or take off at such airports during the periods for which they are fully coordinated need 
a slot allocated by a coordinator. Slot coordination is based on ‘grandfather rights’: a 
slot that has been operated by an airline entitles that airline to claim the same slot in the 
next equivalent scheduling period (winter or summer). 
We highlight two points regarding slot coordination and the present study. The first 
point is that slot coordination is an important institutional feature at European airports, 
and the second point is that in the EU airlines do not schedule their flights freely but are 
restricted by the slots they are allocated (and therefore can use). Given the importance 
of slot coordination in Europe, it is used as an explanatory variable in our regressions. 
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3. DATA AND MODEL 
Most of the data used in this study was provided by the Central Office for Delay 
Analysis (CODA), which is part of Eurocontrol, the European Organization for the 
Safety of Air Navigation. 
The sample period was 2000-2004 and covered all domestic and intra-European 
flights. However, as mentioned above, delay information on a flight-by-flight basis was 
not available. Instead, the data set contained the sum of all delays for all flights operated 
by an airline from a given origin airport to a given destination airport for each season 
(winter, spring, summer and autumn) in each year (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004). 
We then divided that sum of delays by the number of flights in order to obtain the 
average delay, which was the dependent variable in our model. 
Data on the level of slot coordination (non-coordinated, schedules facilitated or fully 
coordinated) at each airport for each season and year was taken from the Worldwide 
Scheduling Guidelines, published periodically by IATA (2000a,b,c; 2001a,b; 2002a,b; 
2004). The slot coordination levels do not vary much over time: once an airport is fully 
coordinated it is unlikely that it will become schedule facilitated or non-coordinated.
78
  
In contrast with Mayer and Sinai (2003) and Rupp (2009), we find controlling for 
local airport demand difficult due to data limitations. They use Metropolitan Statistical 
Area annual data, whereas we use country annual data. Using country data for our 
                                               
7
 The only exception is Koeln/Bonn airport, which was fully coordinated and became schedule 
facilitated in winter 2001. 
8
 14 out of all 444 airports in Europe changed the level of coordination in the period under 
study. This is almost 10 per cent of the 141 slot constrained airports. 
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model, however, is not too problematic, given that competition among European airlines 
and airports tends to take place across countries, rather than within countries. Our 
demand variables include annual GDP per capita, population and unemployment rate for 
the countries where the origin and destination airports are located. These data were 
downloaded from the World Bank website.  To address seasonal demand and weather 
fluctuations, all estimations include a season dummy (winter, spring, summer and 
autumn) along with year dummies. 
Moving on to the model, in line with previous literature, and in particular with Mayer 
and Sinai (2003), we attempt to explain delays at European airports using the following 
variables:  
 
CONCENTRATION, which refers to airport concentration and is measured by the 
Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI) at both the origin and destination airports during 
season s in year t. The intuitive sign for this coefficient is negative: the lower the 
concentration, the higher the expected delay. Airports with low concentration are 
characterized by many airlines with small market share. 
 
SLOT COORDINATION LEVEL, determined at both origin and destination airports. 
Dummies for schedule facilitated and fully coordinated airports were used, and they 
measure effects relative to the non-coordination level. The expected sign for these 
coefficients is positive.  
 
HUB AIRPORT, which is a collection of dummy variables capturing the airport’s 
overall degree of hubbing, and HUB AIRLINE, which is a collection of dummy 
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variables measuring airline’s hub size at a given airport. Following Mayer and Sinai 
(2003) and Rupp (2009) we define HUB AIRPORT and/or HUB AIRLINE on the basis 
of an airport’s connectivity. Thus, airports and airlines in Europe can be classified as 
follows: 
 0 to 14 destinations: non-hubs 
 15 to 44 destinations: small hubs 
 45 to 69 destinations: medium hubs 
 70 and more destinations: big hubs 
The HUB AIRPORT and HUB AIRLINE variables indicate which category is relevant 
for a given airport, with the non-hub category being excluded. 
At this point, it is important to understand that hub airline categories depend on the 
airline and the airport. In particular, an airline can be a hub airline at one airport (small, 
medium or big) and a non-hub airline at another airport. For example, Air France is a 
big hub airline at Paris-Charles De Gaulle but a non-hub airline at Madrid-Barajas, 
which is, however, a big hub airport for Iberia. The expected signs for included HUB 
AIRPORT and HUB AIRLINE dummies are in principle positive: the higher the number 
of connections relative to non-hub category, the higher the expected delay. 
All specifications also contain a dummy for each airline, to control for characteristics 
unique to the airline that might influence delays, such as a high level of inefficiency. 
This dummy also accounts for the type of airline (charter, schedule, low-cost, cargo, 
etc). 
The dependent variable in all our estimations is DELAYijkst. This is the average delay 
in minutes, computed as the difference between the actual landing-touch-down time and 
scheduled landing-touch-down time, for flights from origin airport i to destination 
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airport j operated by airline k during season s in year t. Scheduled arrival time at the 
gate and actual arrival time at the gate would be more meaningful measures. 
Unfortunately, our data base does not include these measures, which is a shortcoming. 
The average delay in minutes is calculated over all flights for a given route, for a 
given airline, for a given season and year.
9
 A route is defined by an origin airport i and 
destination airport j, and route ij is different from route ji. As pointed out above, the 
clock starts at the time when the aircraft is scheduled to take-off and stops when it 
lands.  
In contrast, the dependent variable in Mayer and Sinai (2003) measures excess travel 
time computed as time in excess of the minimum feasible travel time, equal to the 
‘shortest observed travel time’ on a route (p.1201). We cannot construct such measure 
as we were not provided with travel times on a flight-by-flight basis. Mayer and Sinai’s 
measure of delays offers the advantage of being independent from airlines’ scheduling. 
Due to lack of data, we are not able to free our measure from these practices. 
Our baseline delay model is therefore: 
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   
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 Following international standards and definitions, a flight is considered on time if it arrives 
within 15 minutes of its scheduled arrival time. Therefore delays lower than 15 minutes are not 
included in the data base. If there are 100 flights on an ij route operated by airline k during 
season s in year t, and 90 are on time whereas 10 are delayed by more than 15 minutes, adding 
up to a total delay over the 10 flights of 180 minutes, the average delay, which is given by the 
dependent variable, DELAYijkst, is 1.8 minutes. 
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The extra subscripts org and dest are added to highlight that i and j represent origin and 
destination airports, respectively. 
We then run two additional specifications, the first one adding the HUB AIRLINE 
dummies, and the second one including fixed effects.  This second specification 
requires deletion of the HUB AIRPORT dummies, which show no variation over the 
sample period. 
The summary statistics for the most relevant variables are presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
     
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
     
     
DELAYijkst 10.89 12.11 0 518.67 
     
     
Airline hub size     
     
15 - 44 destinations 0.02 0.15 0 1 
     
45 - 69 destinations 0.02 0.14 0 1 
     
70 + destinations 0.05 0.21 0 1 
     
     
Airport hub size     
     
15 - 44 destinations 0.03 0.18 0 1 
     
45 - 69 destinations 0.05 0.23 0 1 
     
70 + destinations 0.18 0.39 0 1 
     
     
Airport slot coordination level    
     
Schedule facilitated 0.18 0.38 0 1 
     
Fully coordinated 0.53 0.50 0 1 
     
     
Airport concentration    
     
 0.18 0.12 0 1 
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4. FINDINGS 
4.1. Basic results 
The results of the baseline specification are presented in Table 2. The regression was 
run for all airports and also for slot constrained airports only, which are busier and more 
congested. The sample including only slot constrained (SC) airports excludes all flights 
that where at least one endpoint was a non-coordinated airport. 
All variables shown on Table 2 are significant at 1 per cent level. Flights originating 
from and arriving at airports with low concentration have higher delays, mirroring the 
results of Mayer and Sinai (2003) and Brueckner (2002a) and providing evidence of 
internalization of congestion.  As expected, the positive HUB AIRPORT coefficients 
show that flights arriving at and departing from hub airports experience higher delays 
than those using non-hub airports.
10
  Although the coefficients for the hubbing variables 
are similar between the full and SC samples, the concentration coefficients are larger in 
absolute value in the SC sample. 
Interestingly, the results show that delays do not increase with the size of the hub: 
delays are lower for medium hubs than for small hubs and big hubs. A tentative 
explanation is that small hubs may be over-stretched in the use of their facilities during 
hubbing periods. 
The slot coordination dummy has different effects for origin and destination airports, 
and for different samples. When all airports are included, delays at origin airports 
increase with the slot coordination level. In other words, delays are highest for fully 
                                               
10
 The only coefficient with a counter-intuitive sign is the one for medium hub at destination. 
However its absolute value is very small. 
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coordinated airports, lower for schedule facilitated ones, and lowest for non-coordinated 
ones.  For destination airports, the effect is difficult to interpret. When all airports are 
included in the sample, delays are lowest for schedule facilitated airports and highest for 
fully coordinated ones. It should be noted, however, that the absolute value of the 
negative coefficient is very small.  When only slot coordinated airports are included in 
the sample, fully coordinated origin airports have higher delays than schedule facilitated 
ones, but for origin airports the coefficient, though positive, is very small. 
The coefficients for the seasonal dummies show higher delays in spring and summer 
and lower delays in autumn, all relative to winter. Spring and summer may be seen as 
periods with higher demand and consequent congestion, which lead to even more delays 
than the bad weather conditions during the winter season. The coefficients for the 
demand variables have intuitive signs in all cases except for the unemployment rate at 
the origin airport. 
 
Table 2: The effect of hub airport, slot coordination and airport concentration on 
flight delays in Europe, 2000-2004 
 
    
Dependent variable: DELAYijkst* 
Ordinary Least Squares 
    
    
 All airports  
Slot constrained 
airports only 
      
      
 Origin Destination  Origin Destination 
      
      
Airport hub size      
      
15 - 44 destinations 1.45 1.30  1.17 1.83 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) 
45 - 69 destinations 0.75 -0.16  0.88 0.01 
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 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.009) (0.009) 
70 + destinations 1.39 3.61  1.81 3.86 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
      
Airport slot coordination level      
      
Schedule facilitated 0.67 -0.098    
 (0.005) (0.005)    
Fully coordinated 0.98 1.20  0.02 1.27 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
      
Airport concentration -3.23 -3.87  -7.16 -5.24 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.026) (0.026) 
      
Demand variables      
      
Annual GDP per capita 0.07 0.81  0.23 0.10 
 (0.0025) (0.0025)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Population 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.01 
 (0.00008) (0.00008)  (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Unemployment rate -0.07 0.09  -0.05 0.15 
 (0.0008) (0.0008)  (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Seasonal variables      
      
Spring (Apr-Jun) 0.43  0.23 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Summer (Jul-Sept) 1.16  1.09 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Autumn (Oct-Dec) -0.22  -0.31 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
      
R² 0.3146     
R² adjusted 0.3146     
F 11,593     
Number of observations 28,746,523     
      
DELAYijkst: average delay in minutes for flights from origin airport i to destination airport j 
operated by airline k during season s in year t. 
 
The units used in the regression were $10,000 for GDP per capita and millions for 
population. 
      
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations also include dummy variables for year 
and airline. 
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4.2. Adding the HUB AIRLINE dummies 
  
The second regression we ran was like the baseline one except that it also included the 
HUB AIRLINE dummies. The results are reported on Table 3. The regression was, 
again, run for all airports and for SC airports only. All variables shown on Table 3 are 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Like in Table 2, flights originating from and arriving 
at airports with low concentration have higher delays, which again, in line with Mayer 
and Sinai (2003) and Brueckner (2002a), can be taken as evidence of internalization. 
Once more, the absolute values of the coefficients for the concentration variable are 
higher for the SC sample. 
As expected, flights arriving at and departing from hub airports experience higher 
delays than those arriving at and departing from non-hub airports. It should be noted 
that in this model, the coefficients for airport hub categories reflect not the (effect of 
hubbing on) delays experienced by all airlines at different airports when compared to 
non-hub airports, but rather the (effect of hubbing on) delays experienced by non-hub 
airlines at different hub size airports, when compared to those experienced at non-hub 
airports. Like in Table 2, delays are lower for medium hubs than for small hubs and big 
hubs. For the SC sample the pattern and coefficients are similar. The same explanation 
as before can be offered in this case: small and medium hubs experience similar levels 
of hubbing activities, with small hubs having more limited facilities in comparison to 
medium hubs. 
The hub airline dummy coefficients show the estimated delays experienced by small, 
medium and big hub airlines when compared to delays experienced by non-hub airlines 
at the same hub size airport. Relative to non-hub airlines at hub airports, small, medium 
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and big hub airlines have smaller delays, in both the all-airports and SC airports 
samples. In other words, an airline experiences lower average delays when it flies to or 
from its own hub. This finding is opposite to that in Mayer and Sinai (2003). They find 
that hub airports have higher delays and that hub airlines experience most of the delays 
at hub airports, pointing to the fact that hub airlines cluster their flights in “banks” of 
arrivals and departures as the reason. As logical as this explanation may sound, it is not 
verified in Europe. The reason is not quite clear but could be linked to one or all of the 
following explanations. First, the hub-and-spoke system in Europe is, as explained in 
Section 2, not as extensive in Europe as in the U.S., so that flight banking (and the 
attendant congestion) is not as pronounced.  Second, given that the clustering of flights 
by hub airlines is constrained by slot coordination, it could be hypothesized that airlines 
are not completely free to schedule waves of arrivals and departures as they wish, with  
the constrained clustering leading to lower delays. Third, non-hub airlines in Europe are 
likely to hold fewer slots than hub airlines at their hubs. While hub airlines can swap 
flights between slots if they need to, non-hub airlines cannot, and so they experience 
higher delays. Finally, on‐time arrivals for hub airlines are more valuable since they 
have connecting passengers whereas non‐hub airlines likely do not. 
The slot coordination dummy has coefficients similar to those from Table 2, except 
for the fully coordinated origin airports in the SC sample, where the coefficient is 
negative, albeit very small. The coefficients for the demand variables and seasonal 
dummies are virtually identical to those from Table 2, and the same interpretation also 
applies. 
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Table 3: The effect of hub airline, hub airport, slot coordination and airport 
concentration on flight delays in Europe, 2000-2004 
 
    
Dependent variable: DELAYijkst* 
Ordinary Least Squares 
    
    
 All airports  
Slot constrained 
airports only 
      
      
 Origin Destination  Origin Destination 
      
      
Airline hub size      
      
15 - 44 destinations -1.84 -2.18  -1.83 -2.02 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.118) 
45 - 69 destinations -2.00 -2.89  -1.86 -3.01 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.012) 
70 + destinations -1.42 -0.64  -1.62 -0.68 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008) 
      
Airport hub size      
      
15 - 44 destinations 2.13 2.16  1.86 2.61 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.010) 
45 - 69 destinations 1.5 0.92  1.49 1.02 
 (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.010) 
70 + destinations 1.94 3.87  2.38 4.09 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) 
      
Airport slot coordination level      
      
Schedule facilitated 0.69 -0.10    
 (0.005) (0.005)    
Fully coordinated 0.94 1.15  -0.04 1.21 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
      
Airport concentration -3.03 -3.82  -6.54 -4.94 
 (0.014) (0.014)  (0.026) (0.026) 
      
Demand variables      
      
Annual GDP per capita 0.07 0.82  0.17 0.98 
 (0.0025) (0.0025)  (0.0034) (0.0034) 
Population 0.02 0.02  0.02 0.01 
 (0.00008) (0.00008)  (0.00009) (0.00009) 
Unemployment rate -0.06 0.10  -0.04 0.15 
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 (0.0008) (0.0008)  (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Seasonal variables      
      
Spring (Apr-Jun) 0.44  0.24 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Summer (Jul-Sept) 1.17  1.10 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Autumn (Oct-Dec) -0.21  -0.30 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
      
R² 0.3186   0.2980  
R² adjusted 0.3185   0.2980  
F 11,746   9,117  
Number of observations 28,746,523   17,676,556  
      
      
DELAYijkst: average delay in minutes for flights from origin airport i to destination airport j 
operated by airline k during season s in year t. 
 
The units used in the regression were $10,000 for GDP per capita and millions for population. 
      
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations also include dummy variables for year 
and airline. 
      
 
 
 
Before moving to the results of the last model, it is worth providing some 
quantitative evaluations of the effect of airport hub size and concentration on delays. 
The effect of airport hub size on delays follows a U-shape. For the all airports sample in 
Table 3, for example, the reduction in average delay when an airport is a medium hub 
rather than a small hub is 0.6 minutes for origin and 1.2 minutes for destination. The 
increase in delay when an airport is a big hub rather than a medium hub is 0.4 minutes 
and almost 3 minutes for origin and destination, respectively. For the SC airports 
sample, the signs are similar but the magnitudes larger in absolute value: reductions in 
average delay of 0.4 and 1.6 minutes when the airport is a medium rather than a small 
hub and increases in average delay of 0.9 and 3.1 minutes when the airport is a big 
rather than a medium hub, all for origin and destination respectively.  When airport 
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concentration increases by one standard deviation (i.e., 0.12, as shown in Table 1) the 
average delay decreases by roughly 0.4 and 0.5 minutes for origin and destination 
airports respectively.  
 
4.3 Fixed effects model 
Many specifications in Mayer and Sinai (2003), Mazzeo (2003) and Rupp (2009) 
include airport fixed effects, i.e. dummy variables for each origin and destination 
airport, in order to control for airport specificities, such as capacity and other factors, 
which can be difficult to measure directly. Table 4 presents the results of a specification 
which includes fixed effects. It should be noted, however, that in this specification the 
airport hub size dummy, which is constant throughout our sample period, is omitted to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity.  
All variables shown on Table 4 are significant at the 1 per cent level. Although the 
signs of the airport concentration variable are still negative, just like in the baseline 
regression, their magnitudes in absolute value are higher, making a stronger case for 
internalization of delays. This result is different from that in Rupp (2009), who finds 
that airport concentration effects are considerably reduced after controlling for airport 
fixed effects. One important difference between Rupp (2009) and the present paper is 
that he is able to include the hub airport size dummy in his regression as well, and the 
estimated coefficients for this variable are also reduced when fixed effects are included.  
The R
2’s in Table 4 are the highest reported in the present paper, which indicates that 
the inclusion of time invariant airport effects plays an important role in explaining 
delays. 
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Finally, there is an important difference between this set of results and those in 
Tables 2 and 3 regarding the coefficients for the slot coordination dummy. For the 
sample that includes all airports, delays are lower at slot constrained airports (unlike in 
the previous regressions where, except for schedule facilitated destination airports,  
delays were higher) and go up with the level of coordination (i.e., they are higher at 
fully coordinated airports than at schedule facilitated ones). For the SC sample, delays 
are higher at fully coordinated airports than at schedule facilitated ones for both origin 
and destination airports, unlike the two previous regressions, where this result was only 
found for destination airports.  
At first sight, the intuition behind these results could contradict our previous 
interpretation. Slot constrained airports are, by definition, busier and more congested, 
and therefore delays would be expected to be higher than at non slot constrained 
airports. On the other hand, it could be argued that slot coordination has the impact of 
reducing delays and this impact is only picked up when the hub airport dummy is 
excluded and the fixed effects are included. It is, however, difficult to offer a 
completely satisfactory explanation for the change in the sign of the coefficient for the 
slot coordination dummy.  
Some of the coefficients for the demand variables have counterintuitive signs, but 
they are very small. The coefficients for the seasonal dummies are very similar to those 
reported on Tables 2 and 3 and the same interpretation applies. 
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Table 4: The effect of hub airline, slot coordination and airport concentration on 
flight delays in Europe, 2000-2004, including airport fixed effects 
 
    
Dependent variable: DELAYijkst* 
Ordinary Least Squares 
    
    
 All airports  
Slot constrained 
airports only 
      
      
 Origin Destination  Origin Destination 
      
      
Airline hub size      
      
15 - 44 destinations -1.64 -1.75  -1.83 -2.07 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.012) (0.012) 
45 - 69 destinations -1.50 -1.65  -1.70 -1.97 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.013) (0.013) 
70 + destinations -1.11 -0.40  -1.42 -0.60 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008) 
      
Airport slot coordination level      
      
Schedule facilitated -2.17 -1.57    
 (0.020) (0.020)    
Fully coordinated -0.48 -1.19  1.98 1.37 
 (0.020) (0.020)  (0.020) (0.020) 
      
Airport concentration -5.89 -4.89  -7.76 -6.47 
 (0.029) (0.029)  (0.047) (0.047) 
      
Demand variables      
      
Annual GDP per capita 0.31 0.02  0.12 -0.01 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Population -0.65 -0.88  -0.63 -0.84 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Unemployment rate -0.09 0.35  0.05 0.57 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Seasonal variables      
      
Spring (Apr-Jun) 0.37  0.22 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
Summer (Jul-Sept) 1.07  1.08 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
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Autumn (Oct-Dec) -0.22  -0.29 
 (0.004)  (0.005) 
      
R² 0.3994   0.3818  
R² adjusted 0.3993   0.3818  
F 9,741   10,118  
Number of observations 28,746,523   17,676,556  
      
      
DELAYijkst: average delay in minutes for flights from origin airport i to destination airport j 
operated by airline k during season s in year t. 
 
The units used in the regression were $10,000 for GDP per capita and millions for population. 
      
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Equations also include dummy variables for year 
and airline. 
      
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to identify the causes behind delays at European airports. 
While there are a number of empirical studies on this matter conducted for the U.S. 
(such as for example, Mayer and Sinai, 2003 and Rupp, 2009), this is the first one ever 
done for Europe. 
The variables we used were hub airport and hub airline dummies, airport 
concentration, slot coordination, and airline dummies. We also included demand 
variables as well as seasonal and year dummies. 
While HUB AIRPORT coefficients indicate that delays at hubs are higher than at non 
hub airports, the effect does not increase monotonically with the size of the hub, but 
instead follows a U-shape.  The hub airline dummies have puzzling negative 
coefficients, but this result may be explained by the facts that the hub-and-spoke system 
in Europe is not as extensive as in the U.S. and the waves of arrivals and departures are 
constrained by slot coordination at most hub airports. The coefficients for the airport 
concentration variable are negative, a finding that can be taken as evidence for 
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internalization. Therefore, our results support the internalization hypothesis while 
offering a hubbing puzzle, which may be explained by the differences between 
European and American airports regarding hub-and-spoke operations and slot 
coordination. 
Given our favorable results regarding internalization, we propose, like Brueckner 
(2002a,b) and Mayer and Sinai (2003), that a congestion charge should be set equal to 
the congestion externality not already internalized by the airlines.  This toll would vary 
depending on the size of the airline, with large carriers (who internalize much of the 
congestion they create) paying a low toll and small airlines paying a high toll.  
Unfortunately, however, charging airline-specific tolls is probably not politically 
feasible. Morrison and Winston (2007), for example, argue that airlines would likely 
oppose a differentiated charging system.  They argue that, in any case, the difference in 
welfare gains would be small because ‘the bulk of airport delays are not internalized and 
because the efficiency loss from pricing internalized congestion is small’ (p.1970). 
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APPENDIX: Slot constrained airports in Europe (for the year 2004) 
 
Slot coordination level  Airport name  Country where airport is 
     
Schedule facilitated  GRAZ  AUSTRIA 
Schedule facilitated  INNSBRUCK  AUSTRIA 
Schedule facilitated  KLAGENFURT  AUSTRIA 
Schedule facilitated  LINZ  AUSTRIA 
Schedule facilitated  SALZBURG  AUSTRIA 
Fully coordinated  WIEN SCHWECHAT  AUSTRIA 
Fully coordinated  BRUSSELS NATIONAL  BELGIUM 
Schedule facilitated  SOFIA  BULGARIA 
Schedule facilitated  LARNACA  CYPRUS 
Fully coordinated  PRAHA RUZYNE  CZECH REPUBLIC 
Fully coordinated  COPENHAGEN KASTRUP  DENMARK 
Fully coordinated  HELSINKI-VANTAA  FINLAND 
Schedule facilitated  BALE-MULHOUSE  FRANCE 
Fully coordinated  LYON SATOLAS  FRANCE 
Schedule facilitated  NICE  FRANCE 
Fully coordinated  PARIS CH DE GAULLE  FRANCE 
Fully coordinated  PARIS ORLY  FRANCE 
Schedule facilitated  BREMEN  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  DRESDEN  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  DUESSELDORF  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  ERFURT  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  FRANKFURT MAIN  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  HAMBURG  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  HANNOVER LANGENHAGEN  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  KOELN-BONN  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  LEIPZIG/HALLE  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  MUENCHEN 2  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  MUENSTER-OSNABRUECK  GERMANY 
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Schedule facilitated  NUERNBERG  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  SAARBRUCKEN/ENSHEIM  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  SCHOENEFELD-BERLIN  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  STUTTGART  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  TEGEL-BERLIN  GERMANY 
Fully coordinated  TEMPELHOF-BERLIN  GERMANY 
Schedule facilitated  ATHINAI E. VENIZELOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  CHIOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  DIAGORAS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  IOANNIS/KAPODISTRIAS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  KARPATHOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  KEFALLINIA  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  KHANIA SOUDA  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  KOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  LIMNOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  MAKEDONIA  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  MEGAS/ALEXANDROS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  MIKONOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  MITILINI  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  NIKOS/KAZANTZAKIS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  PREVEZA/LEVKAS AKTIO  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  SAMOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  SANTORINI  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  SKIATHOS  GREECE 
Fully coordinated  ZAKINTHOS  GREECE 
Schedule facilitated  FERIHEGY-BUDAPEST  HUNGARY 
Fully coordinated  KEFLAVIK  ICELAND 
Fully coordinated  DUBLIN  IRELAND 
Fully coordinated  BERGAMO/ORIO ALSERIO  ITALY 
Schedule facilitated  BOLOGNA  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  CAGLIARI ELMAS  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  CATANIA FONTANAROSSA  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  FIRENZE/PERETOLA  ITALY 
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Fully coordinated  LAMPEDUSA  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  MILANO LINATE  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  MILANO MALPENSA  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  NAPOLI CAPODICHINO  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  PALERMO PUNTA RAISI  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  PANTELLERIA  ITALY 
Schedule facilitated  PISA SAN GIUSTO  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  ROMA CIAMPINO  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  ROME FIUMICINO  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  TORINO/CASELLE  ITALY 
Fully coordinated  VENEZIA TESSERA  ITALY 
Schedule facilitated  LUXEMBOURG  LUXEMBOURG 
Schedule facilitated  SKOPJE  MACEDONIA, EX-YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 
Schedule facilitated  MALTA LUQA  MALTA 
Fully coordinated  EINDHOVEN  NETHERLANDS 
Fully coordinated  ROTTERDAM  NETHERLANDS 
Fully coordinated  SCHIPHOL AMSTERDAM  NETHERLANDS 
Schedule facilitated  BERGEN/FLESLAND  NORWAY 
Fully coordinated  OSLO/GARDERMOEN  NORWAY 
Fully coordinated  STAVANGER/SOLA  NORWAY 
Schedule facilitated  GDANSK/LECH WALESA  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  KATOWICE/PYRZOWICE  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  KRAKOW/BALICE  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  POZNAN/LAWICA  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  RZESZOW/JASIONKA  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  SZCZECIN/GOLENIOW  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  WARSZAWA/OKECIE  POLAND 
Schedule facilitated  WROCLAW/STRACHOWICE  POLAND 
Fully coordinated  FARO  PORTUGAL 
Fully coordinated  FUNCHAL  PORTUGAL 
Fully coordinated  LISBOA  PORTUGAL 
Schedule facilitated  PONTA DELGADA  PORTUGAL 
Fully coordinated  PORTO  PORTUGAL 
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Fully coordinated  PRISTINA  SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 
Fully coordinated  PRISTINA AIRPORT, UNMIK (ON A TEMPORARY BASIS)  SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 
Schedule facilitated  BRATISLAVA IVANKA  SLOVAKIA 
Schedule facilitated  LJUBLJANA  SLOVENIA 
Fully coordinated  ALICANTE  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  ALMERIA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  BARCELONA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  BILBAO  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  FUERTEVENTURA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  GERONA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  IBIZA  SPAIN 
Schedule facilitated  LA CORUNA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  LAS PALMAS  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  MADRID BARAJAS  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  MAHON/MENORCA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  MALAGA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  PALMA DE MALLORCA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  REUS  SPAIN 
Schedule facilitated  SANTIAGO  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  SEVILLA  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  TENERIFE NORTE  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  TENERIFE SUR  SPAIN 
Fully coordinated  VALENCIA  SPAIN 
Schedule facilitated  VITORIA  SPAIN 
Schedule facilitated  ZARAGOZA  SPAIN 
Schedule facilitated  GOTEBORG/LANDVETTER  SWEDEN 
Fully coordinated  STOCKHOLM-ARLANDA  SWEDEN 
Fully coordinated  STOCKHOLM-BROMMA  SWEDEN 
Fully coordinated  GENEVE COINTRIN  SWITZERLAND 
Fully coordinated  ZURICH  SWITZERLAND 
Fully coordinated  ANKARA-ESENBOGA  TURKEY 
Fully coordinated  ANTALYA  TURKEY 
Fully coordinated  ISTANBUL-ATATURK  TURKEY 
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Fully coordinated  IZMIR-ADNAN-MENDERES  TURKEY 
Schedule facilitated  MILAS/BODRUM  TURKEY 
Schedule facilitated  MUGLA-DALAMAN  TURKEY 
Fully coordinated  KIEV - BORISPOL  UKRAINE 
Schedule facilitated  ABERDEEN  UNITED KINGDOM 
Schedule facilitated  BIRMINGHAM  UNITED KINGDOM 
Schedule facilitated  EDINBURGH  UNITED KINGDOM 
Schedule facilitated  GLASGOW  UNITED KINGDOM 
Schedule facilitated  LONDON/CITY  UNITED KINGDOM 
Fully coordinated  LONDON/GATWICK  UNITED KINGDOM 
Fully coordinated  LONDON/HEATHROW  UNITED KINGDOM 
Fully coordinated  LONDON/STANSTED  UNITED KINGDOM 
Fully coordinated  MANCHESTER  UNITED KINGDOM 
Schedule facilitated  NEWCASTLE  UNITED KINGDOM 
     
 
Source: Worldwide Scheduling Guidelines (IATA, 2004) 
 
